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FINDING THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT
FOR PRESCHOOLERS UNDER THE IDEA: AN
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Theresa M. DeMonte
Abstract: Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, both school- and
preschool-age children who qualify for special education services are entitled to education in
the least restrictive environments appropriate to their needs. For school-age children, the
presumptive least restrictive environment is the regular class where their nondisabled peers
participate. By contrast, defining an analogous environment for preschool children is
difficult, because public schools rarely provide preschool for children without disabilities.
This Comment argues that the Act’s language, principles, purposes, and implementing
regulations suggest that the settings where a preschool child’s nondisabled peers learn should
be identified as that child’s presumptive least restrictive environment. Examples of such
settings may include the home, community, and regular preschool. This Comment then
provides an analytical framework that courts can use when determining the least restrictive
environment for a preschool child.

INTRODUCTION
Nate is an adorable three-year-old whose favorite activities at
preschool include singing at circle time, digging in the sand table, and
playing restaurant in the pretend kitchen.1 Though a casual observer
might not immediately notice, Nate displays the classic symptoms of
autism, including repetitive behaviors, restricted interests, impaired
social skills, and disordered communication. Despite his significant
impairments, Nate has been successfully participating in regular2
preschool with the help of a trained aide who prompts him to respond
appropriately to his teacher and peers.
Having heard that preschoolers with disabilities are entitled to
educational services under federal law, Nate’s parents approach the local
school district. After conducting an evaluation, the district tells Nate’s
parents that he qualifies for services and may attend the district’s autism
preschool program for two hours per day. The classroom consists of six
children, all diagnosed with autism, taught by one teacher and two aides.
1. The author created this hypothetical for illustrative purposes.
2. Throughout this Comment, the term “regular” environments refers to public and private
educational settings designed for the general population, while “special” environments are those
designed specifically to meet the needs of children with disabilities.
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Nate’s parents urge the school district to consider keeping Nate in a
preschool where he could participate with nondisabled children. The
school district administration informs the parents that they only fund
public programs. Because the district does not provide regular
preschools for nondisabled children, Nate’s parents are told they will
either need to accept the autism preschool program or continue to fund
the private program themselves.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) entitles
children with disabilities, including preschool children such as Nate, to
individualized educations in the least restrictive environment (LRE)
appropriate to their needs.3 Despite this requirement, parents of
preschool children sometimes face obstacles with its implementation and
find themselves torn between educating their child in a regular preschool
or community setting at their own expense or foregoing a placement
alongside nondisabled peers in order to secure free special education
services.4 The IDEA presumes that children will be educated in regular
educational environments, unless their individual needs dictate that a
special class or school is required.5 Therefore, this Comment will refer
to regular educational settings as the “presumptive” least restrictive
environment. The presumptive least restrictive environment for schoolage children is the regular class where nondisabled children are
educated, and moving a child to a special setting requires justification
based on the child’s needs.6 However, schools are often uncertain which
environment constitutes the presumptive least restrictive environment
for preschoolers—in part because there are often no generally available
public education settings for nondisabled preschool children.7
This uncertainty about how the LRE provisions apply to preschoolers
3. The IDEA entitles qualifying children ages three through twenty-one to receive a “free
appropriate public education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006). An individualized education
program is to be crafted for each child, id. § 1412(a)(4), and under a provision titled “Least
restrictive environment,” a child is to be educated with children who are not disabled “to the
maximum extent appropriate,” id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
4. See infra Part III (citing cases in which schools denied preschool students placements in
regular settings).
5. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2008) (denoting special classes and
special schools as distinct from regular classes).
6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (noting that “removal of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such
that education in regular classes . . . cannot be achieved satisfactorily”).
7. Alefia Mithaiwala, Comment, Universal Preschool: A Solution to a Special Education Law
Dilemma, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 373, 386–87 (discussing the preschool “LRE dilemma” and
arguing that it exists “because most school districts do not have regular public preschool options for
their three- to five-year-old population”).
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is ripe for clarification, and the critical importance of early intervention
for disabled children8 makes the LRE issue particularly high-stakes for
this population. The Supreme Court has never decided an LRE case—
much less one applying the requirement to preschoolers—and lower
federal courts diverge on what constitutes the presumptive least
restrictive environment for preschoolers.9 Although legal journals
provide a plethora of articles focusing on how the LRE requirement
applies to older children,10 they are short on scholarship dealing with
these requirements as they apply to preschoolers.11 This Comment helps
resolve this uncertainty by explaining how the statutory and regulatory
provisions of the IDEA apply to preschoolers.
Part I presents the history of the IDEA as it pertains to preschool
students with disabilities, and Part II explores the background of its key
provisions. Part III summarizes federal cases where preschool placement
was at issue and shows that courts have applied differing analyses to the
preschool LRE context. Part IV draws on the text of the IDEA, its

8. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, at IV-33 (2002),
available at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2002/section-iv.pdf (reporting findings
that document many positive results for children and their families after one year of early
intervention).
9. Some of the circuit courts have adopted their own tests to discern whether a child is being
educated in the least restrictive environment. E.g., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H.,
14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting a four-factor balancing test requiring courts to
consider the educational and non-academic benefits of regular settings as well as the cost involved
and the effects of the student on the teacher and other children); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ.,
874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) (adopting a two-part test in which courts determine whether
education in the regular class can be achieved satisfactorily before deciding whether the child has
been mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063
(6th Cir. 1983) (adopting a test applicable when “a segregated facility is considered superior”
requiring courts to determine whether similar services can be feasibly provided in a non-segregated
setting); see infra Part III.
10. See Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006 BYU EDUC. &
L.J. 189; Sarah E. Farley, Comment, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom
Placement of Students with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 77 WASH. L. REV. 809 (2002); Joshua
Andrew Wolfe, Note, A Search for the Best IDEA: Balancing the Conflicting Provisions of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1627 (2002) (arguing that the LRE
requirements conflict with the requirements for a free appropriate public education and need to be
reconciled); Marc C. Weber, Response, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration
Presumption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 174 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/
10-2007/Weber.pdf.
11. The author found only one scholarly law journal article directly addressing the LRE
provisions as they apply to preschoolers. The article proposed universal preschool as a catch-all
solution, but did not explain how states without universal preschool were currently obligated under
the IDEA to provide the LRE to preschoolers—the issue this Comment seeks to resolve. See
Mithaiwala, supra note 7.
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purposes, and its history to propose a framework courts should apply
when the least restrictive environment for a preschool child is at issue.
Courts should look first to the settings that the child’s same-aged peers
are learning in to determine the child’s presumptive least restrictive
environment. Second, they should ask whether the child can be
successfully educated in these settings. This approach best implements
the principles of the IDEA and comports with Congress’s preference that
children with disabilities receive their educations in regular settings.
I.

THE IDEA REFLECTS CONGRESS’S INCREASING
EMPHASIS ON INCLUSION AND FAMILY-CENTERED
EARLY INTERVENTION

The IDEA had its genesis in a movement of parents and educators
fighting to secure public education for children with disabilities. These
efforts spanned the twentieth century12 and gained inspiration from both
the broader civil rights movement13 and the belief that inclusion in
public education could help children with disabilities gain
independence.14 As momentum grew for nationwide change, Congress
responded by enacting legislation that conditioned funding to the states
on whether they provided children with disabilities access to appropriate
public education.15 Later, as research increasingly suggested that earlier
intervention led to better outcomes, the right-to-education movement
sought to improve services to preschoolers.16

12. See LEOPOLD LIPPMAN & I. IGNACY GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCATION: ANATOMY OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5 (1973).
13. See id. at 12–15 (noting that the groundwork for a key “[r]ight to [e]ducation” case was laid
by Brown v. Board of Education).
14. See id. at 12–13 (noting that others drew on the language in Brown that education “is a
principal instrument for . . . helping [a child] to adjust normally to his environment. It is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education” and applied it to children with disabilities (internal citations omitted)).
15. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)).
16. This research was presented to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by
parents, teachers, and experts in special education. See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 1, 81–82 (1975),
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1425, 1479 (“[W]e feel that it is imperative to point out that
the benefits of early identification and education, both in terms of prevention of future human
tragedy, and in the long-term cost effectiveness of tax dollars, are so great as to justify continued
emphasis upon preschool education for handicapped children.”). The continued efforts of advocates
led to the passage of laws providing broader services to preschoolers. See infra Part I.B.
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By Enacting Comprehensive Special Education Reforms, Congress
Recognized Two Principles: The Right to Educational Opportunity
and the Right to Integration

As recently as the mid-1970s, schools across the nation routinely
excluded millions of children with disabilities or warehoused them in
inadequate special education programs.17 Although it took many years
for this issue to gain national prominence, local efforts addressing the
problem began as early as the end of the nineteenth century, when some
cities established special classes for mildly impaired children.18
Heartened by the possibilities such schools offered, parents of children
with disabilities formed local grassroots organizations and advocated for
their children’s right to education.19
These groups’ tireless advocacy bore fruit: their efforts persuaded
many legislators and school boards that the benefits of educating
disabled children were worth the costs.20 California became the first state
to mandate special education services for cognitively impaired children,
and several other states followed suit.21
As their children began receiving long-sought special education,
parents began to view the frequent segregation of their children from
regular classrooms as unjust.22 The Court’s landmark decision in Brown
v. Board of Education,23 holding that separate education based on race is
inherently unequal,24 resonated with many advocates for children with
disabilities.25 They adopted the rhetoric of the civil rights movement and
looked to the courts to vindicate these children’s rights.26
17. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (congressional findings).
18. LIPPMAN & GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 5 (1973) (noting that Providence, Springfield,
Boston, and Chicago began offering special classes for cognitively impaired children before 1900).
19. See id. at 10–11. The influence of these local groups converged in 1950 when parents founded
the National Association for Retarded Children (NARC), which was among the first national
organizations to advocate on behalf of children with disabilities. See id.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 6 (“[B]y the early 1950s first California and then other states were beginning to mandate
special educational services for the mentally retarded.” (internal citation omitted)).
22. See id. at 10.
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. Id. at 493.
25. See LIPPMAN & GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 12–13 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that exclusion
of children with disabilities from schools violated procedural due process and equal protection); Pa.
Ass’n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258–59 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(noting that action brought on behalf of mentally retarded children deprived of free public education
alleged in its complaint the unconstitutionality of such practices under the Equal Protection Clause).
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Across the country, advocates filed lawsuits asserting that schools
were excluding children with disabilities from public education in
violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Constitution.27 In many cases, the decisions confirmed that children with
disabilities were entitled to educations suited to their needs.28 States
without laws addressing the education of disabled children responded by
passing laws entitling children with disabilities to appropriate
educations.29
By 1975, all but two states had enacted such legislation.30 Despite
these laws, many states were unable to accommodate all children, and
claimed that lack of funds hindered their compliance.31 With millions of
children in limbo—unable to receive the services to which they were
legally entitled—Congress took action. In 1975, it enacted a
comprehensive national policy called the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA).32 This law amended the Education of the
Handicapped Act, and conditioned federal funds on the provision of free
appropriate public educations to children with disabilities.33 By creating
incentives for the states to adopt federal policy, Congress took a more
active role in enabling children with disabilities to become productive
citizens.34
27. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 3–4 (1975) (noting that since PARC and Mills there had been
forty-six completed or pending cases in twenty-eight states).
28. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 7 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1431 (noting that
more than thirty-six court decisions had recognized that children with disabilities have the right to
receive appropriate educations); see, e.g., Mills, 348 F. Supp. 866; PARC, 334 F. Supp. 1257.
29. See Frederick J. Weintraub & Joseph Ballard, Introduction: Bridging the Decades, in
SPECIAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: ITS LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS 1, 3 (Joseph
Ballard et al. eds., 1982).
30. Id.
31. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 7, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1431 (noting that lack of
financial resources had prevented compliance with court decisions requiring states to educate
children with disabilities).
32. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)).
33. Id. § 612, 89 Stat. at 780 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412) (“In order to qualify for
assistance . . . a State shall demonstrate . . . that the . . . State has in effect a policy that assures all
handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education.”).
34. See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433 (“[O]ver the past
few years, parents of handicapped children have begun to recognize that their children are being
denied services which are guaranteed under the Constitution. It should not, however, be necessary
for parents throughout the country to continue utilizing the courts to assure themselves a remedy. It
is this Committee’s belief that the Congress must take a more active role under its responsibility for
equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped children are provided equal educational
opportunity. It can no longer be the policy of the Government to merely establish an unenforceable
goal requiring all children to be in school.”).
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Congress Has Increasingly Emphasized Early Educational
Intervention for Preschoolers with Disabilities

The 1975 amendments did not ensure that preschool children would
receive the same entitlements as school-age children with disabilities.
While the EAHCA generally required states to educate children with
disabilities ages three to twenty-one, it exempted states from educating
children ages three through five if doing so was inconsistent with state
law or practice.35 States that elected to educate a subset of preschool
children with disabilities, however, were subject to the requirements of
the EAHCA with respect to those children.36 Thus, states could dodge
the Act’s requirements by declining to serve preschoolers altogether.37
The lack of a full mandate for preschool education in the final bill
was contentious.38 The Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped had
proposed a version that mandated services for children ages three
through five.39 In the hearings preceding the EAHCA’s passage,
Congress heard ample testimony that preschool-age children stood to
benefit the most from special education services because early
intervention could ameliorate the disabling effects of many conditions.40
Ultimately cost concerns trumped these arguments, and after being
reported to the full committee, the preschool mandate was dropped.41
Several dissenting senators acknowledged the states’ fiscal concerns, but
emphasized that foregoing a full preschool mandate could cost taxpayers
more education dollars in the long run because children deprived of
effective early educational intervention may require more intensive
services later.42

35. See id. at 18–19, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1442–43 (listing the reasons a state
could be exempted, and noting that the exemption did not apply when a state tried to abandon
providing services).
36. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 612, 89 Stat.
773, 780–81 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006)).
37. Assuming, that is, that the state was not abandoning services previously provided. See S. REP.
NO. 94-168, at 18–19, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1442–43.
38. The Senate Report included the dissenting views of five senators who asserted that failure to
provide a full mandate for preschool children “diluted” the commitment of the Act to such children
and cited testimony indicating that “special educational services provided to handicapped children
before ‘normal’ school age were often the most beneficial, since much more could be done at an
earlier age to ameliorate, alter, or develop skills to compensate for certain handicapping conditions.”
Id. at 81–82, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1479–80.
39. Id. at 82, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1480.
40. Id. at 81–82, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1479–80.
41. Id.
42. Id. (“We are cognizant of the concerns of the States regarding their financial capacity to
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In the wake of the EAHCA, the cost-benefit debate continued. Ten
years after its enactment, only twenty-one states and the District of
Columbia offered educational services to all preschool children with
disabilities.43 To remedy this, Congress amended the Education for the
Handicapped Act in 1986,44 giving states greater incentives to serve all
qualifying preschool children with disabilities beginning at age three.45
These amendments also added provisions that conditioned grants on
providing services to infants and toddlers with disabilities from birth
through age two.46 In addition to offering states a carrot in the form of
increased funding, the new law also came with a stick: states that failed
to provide free appropriate public educations to all qualifying
preschoolers by 1991 risked losing funds and grants they received under
the old law.47
Most of the key features of the 1986 amendments remain today, and
all states currently provide education to preschool children with
qualifying disabilities.48

provide a [sic] full educational services to this group of children. Nevertheless, we feel that it is
imperative to point out that the benefits of early identification and education, both in terms of
prevention of future human tragedy, and in the long-term cost effectiveness of tax dollars, are so
great as to justify continued emphasis upon preschool education for handicapped children.”).
43. H. REP. NO. 99-860, at 42 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2401, 2444 (“Currently, all
states participate in the state grant program for children 6 to 17, but as of July 1985, only 21 states,
4 territories, and the District of Columbia served all handicapped children from age 3.”).
44. See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, 100 Stat.
1145 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (2006)).
45. Pascal L. Trohanis, An Introduction to PL 99-457 and The National Policy Agenda for
Serving Young Children with Special Needs and Their Families, in POLICY IMPLEMENTATION & PL
99-457: PLANNING FOR YOUNG CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 1, 5–13 (James J. Gallagher et al.
eds., 1989).
46. Id. at 2–3.
47. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, § 619(b)(1),
100 Stat. 1145, 1156 (“[T]he Secretary shall make a grant to any State which . . . has a State
plan . . . which includes policies and procedures that assure the availability under the State law and
practice of such State of a free appropriate public education for all handicapped children aged three
to five, inclusive.”); see Trohanis, supra note 45, at 13 (“[T]he new law builds in some penalties for
states that do not achieve a full mandate for FAPE covering 3- through 5-year-olds by the 1990–
1991 school year. Failure to comply will result in loss of the new preschool grant money, as well as
funds generated under Part B of the State Plan formula for this population group, as well as
designated EHA discretionary grants, including those for research, training, and demonstration
activities.”).
48. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, at II-76 (2005),
available at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/index.html (listing all fifty states under a
table tallying children ages three through five served under the IDEA) [hereinafter TWENTYSEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT].
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The IDEA and Its Amendments Expressed a Stronger Commitment
to Educating Preschoolers in a Seamless Fashion in the Least
Restrictive Environment

In 1990, Congress reauthorized the Education for the Handicapped
Act and renamed it the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA).49 The following year, Congress enacted amendments50 in part to
“facilitate the development of a comprehensive ‘seamless’ system of
services for children, aged birth to 5, inclusive, and their families . . . .”51
The amendments required that services for infants and toddlers take
place in “natural environments,” including home and community
settings, “to the maximum extent appropriate.”52 Additionally, the new
law required states to develop policies and procedures to ensure a
smooth transition for children as they prepared to enter public school.53
The amendments also allowed the service plan of an infant or toddler to
continue through age five whenever appropriate.54
The IDEA’s 1997 amendments explicitly included the term “least
restrictive environment,”55 which had previously appeared only in the
implementing regulations.56 The Department of Education issued
subsequent regulations stating that the LRE provisions apply fully to
preschool children.57
Congress most recently amended the IDEA in 2004 by passing the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act.58 In doing so,

49. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901(a)(1),
104 Stat. 1103, 1141–42.
50. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102119, 105 Stat. 587.
51. H.R. REP. NO. 102-198, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 310, 313.
52. IDEA Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-119, § 12, 105 Stat. 587, 595–596 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1432(4)(G) (2006)).
53. Id. § 5, 105 Stat. 587, 591 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(9)).
54. Id. § 6, 105 Stat. 587, 591 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(B)).
55. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 10517, § 612, 111 Stat. 37, 61 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006)).
56. Jean B. Crockett, The Least Restrictive Environment and the 1997 Amendments and Federal
Regulations, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 543, 552 (1999) (“There is no definition given in this section for the
term LRE, but a cross-reference is made to Sec. 1412 (a)(5)(A) where the term now appears, for the
first time, within the text of the law. . . . The words “least restrictive environment” have officially
been transferred from the federal regulations into the statute.”).
57. Id. at 555–56 (“References to the LRE provisions can be found explicitly in several sections
of the reauthorized federal code. . . . A reference that these LRE provisions apply to preschool
children with disabilities now appears in [then] Sec. 300.552.”).
58. Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)).
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Congress highlighted the IDEA’s primary purpose of preparing children
with disabilities for integrated adult lives59 by requiring each child’s
educational plan to address functional, as well as academic, areas of
limitation.60 In its findings, Congress emphasized that the education of
children with disabilities would be enhanced by “strengthening the role
and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of such children
have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their
children at school and at home.”61
The central role the family plays in the child’s education is
particularly evident with respect to very young children. The law
currently provides that an interdisciplinary team will craft an
Individualized Family Service Plan for infants and toddlers.62 The plan
must include a statement of the family’s strengths and needs that relate
to the enhancement of the child’s development, and a statement of
outcomes expected for the family as a whole and for the child as an
individual.63
The modern IDEA reflects Congress’s commitment to promoting
individualized, inclusive educations for children with disabilities.64 The
Act entitles such children to a free appropriate public education (FAPE)

59. “Improving educational results for children with disabilities is an essential element of our
national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2006)
(congressional findings).
60. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II) (2006) (“[An individualized education program includes]
a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals, designed
to . . . meet the child’s needs that result from the child’s disability to enable the child to be involved
in and make progress in the general education curriculum.” (emphasis added)). For preschool
children, such goals might address self-help activities, social skills, and participation in the
community.
61. Id. § 1400(c)(5)(B).
62. Id. § 1436; see id. § 1436(d) (requiring that the plan contain a statement of the family’s
resources, priorities, and concerns, as well as a statement of outcomes or results expected for the
family as a whole). Congress took a family-systems approach in drafting the Individualized Family
Service Plan requirements because it “recognized that the capacity of infants and toddlers to
succeed in any educational program depends on that child’s family” and an effective effort to help
infants and toddlers must “includ[e] the goal of enhancing families’ capacity to meet the special
needs of their infants and toddlers with disabilities.” Matthew J. Stowe & H. Rutherford Turnbull
III, Legal Considerations of Inclusion for Infants and Toddlers and for Preschool-Age Children, in
EARLY CHILDHOOD INCLUSION: FOCUS ON CHANGE 79 (Michael J. Guralnick ed., 2001).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1436(d)(2)–(3).
64. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). Not all children who have impairments that might be considered a
disability will necessarily qualify to receive services under the IDEA. The IDEA defines “child with
a disability” as a child having at least one of a list of enumerated impairments and who, “by reason
thereof, needs special education and related services.” Id. § 1401(3)(A).
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from ages three through twenty-one.65 The educational services a child
receives are listed on the child’s individualized education program (IEP),
a written plan crafted by a multidisciplinary team that includes the
child’s parents.66 The IDEA also expresses Congress’s preference that
children with disabilities be educated in regular environments alongside
their nondisabled peers when consistent with their needs.67 If the child’s
parents believe the IEP fails to confer a free appropriate public education
in the least restrictive environment, they may challenge its adequacy68 by
pursuing mediation or requesting a due process hearing before an
impartial hearing officer.69 After exhausting administrative remedies,
parents can file a civil action in state or federal court.70
II.

THE IDEA ENSURES AN “APPROPRIATE” EDUCATION IN
THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT

The IDEA entitles qualifying preschool children to the same benefits
as their school-age counterparts: a free appropriate public education in
the least restrictive environment.71 The meaning and application of these
entitlements has been contested,72 and the special situation of preschool
children raises even more difficulties.73
A.

Congress Crafted Procedures to Assure Appropriate,
Individualized Educations for Children with Disabilities

Congress requires that the environment in which a child with
disabilities is educated—his or her placement—be in the least restrictive
environment in which the substantive content of the child’s IEP can be
successfully implemented, with the use of supplementary aids and
65. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
66. See id. § 1414(d).
67. See id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
68. Id. § 1415(b).
69. Id. § 1415(f).
70. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
71. See id. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (“A free appropriate public education is available to all children with
disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive.”); id. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To
the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are
not disabled.”).
72. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187 (1982) (contesting provision of free
appropriate public education); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404
(9th Cir. 1994) (contesting LRE); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir.
1989) (contesting LRE).
73. See infra Part II.D.3.
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services.74 The substantive content of the child’s IEP is delivered when a
child can achieve his or her individual annual goals.75 The IEP team
crafts these goals with an eye to helping the child bridge the educational
gap his or her disability creates.76 The team describes this educational
gap in a statement explaining how the student’s disability “affects the
child’s involvement and progress in the general education curriculum,”77
which is the same curriculum as that used for nondisabled children.78
There is no general curriculum for preschool children;79 instead, the
statute instructs that a preschooler’s statement may describe how the
disability affects his or her participation in “appropriate activities” for
that age group.80
“Appropriate activities” has a potentially expansive meaning that is
not limited by the Act or its regulations. In response to public comments,
the Department of Education explained that “appropriate activities”
refers to “age-relevant developmental abilities or milestones that
typically developing children of the same age would be performing or
would have achieved.”81 The IEPs of preschool children are designed to
improve the child’s participation in appropriate activities and thereby
receive the appropriate educations they are entitled to under the IDEA.
B.

Courts Have Struggled to Define the Meaning of “Appropriate
Education”

At the center of the IDEA is the right to receive a free appropriate
public education.82 The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the
74. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1412.
75. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
76. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(II). The child’s annual goals serve the purpose of “meet[ing]
the child’s needs that result from the child’s disability to enable the child to be involved in and
make progress in the general education curriculum; and meet each of the child’s other educational
needs that result from the child’s disability.” Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II).
77. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(aa).
78. Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,535,
12,592 (Dep’t of Educ. Mar. 12, 1999) (describing the general curriculum as “the same curriculum
as for nondisabled children”).
79. Id. at 12,593 (noting that preschool children are “of an age for which there is not a general
curriculum for nondisabled children”).
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(bb).
81. Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the Early Intervention
Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities; Final Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,405, 12,471
(Dep’t of Educ. Mar. 12, 1999).
82. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A)–(D). This section defines a free appropriate public education as:
[S]pecial education and related services that (A) have been provided at public expense, under
public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State
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word “appropriate” in the seminal case Board of Education v. Rowley,83
holding that an education is not appropriate within the meaning of the
Act unless both procedural84 and substantive standards are met.85 The
Supreme Court first found that the Act’s statutory findings and text
suggested that Congress primarily intended to provide disabled children
with access to education, and did not intend to guarantee a particular
educational outcome.86
The Court held that the requisite procedural standard for an
“appropriate” education is achieved when schools comply with
statutorily specified procedures, and the substantive standard is reached
when a child’s educational program consists of individualized special
education and related services that are calculated to confer an
educational benefit.87
After Rowley, lower courts grappled with an issue the Court failed to
address—what level of educational benefit meets the appropriate
standard? Rowley foreclosed the interpretation that “appropriate”
requires a potential-maximizing benefit; the broadest possible reading of
Rowley suggests that an education is “appropriate” when a child receives
some educational benefit, no matter how insignificant.88 Lower courts
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary
school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title.
Id. (formatting modified for brevity). Although the IDEA was enacted in 1990, the free appropriate
public education requirement has been in force since the EAHCA was enacted in 1975. See
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 612, 89 Stat. 773, 780
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006)).
83. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
84. Id. at 206–07. Congress envisioned the IEP procedural requirements as the primary
guarantors of substantive validity. The legislative history from PL 94-142 suggests that the
procedures surrounding evaluation, eligibility determinations, placement, and prior written notice
requirements were the primary way Congress sought to ensure that children received appropriate
educations. The Senate Report notes:
[T]he individualized written educational plan . . . would require school systems to develop an
expertise and ability to provide services guaranteed to assure educational progress . . . . [By
emphasizing] the process of parent and child involvement and to provide a written record of
reasonable expectations, the Committee intends to clarify that such individualized planning
conferences are a way to provide parent involvement and protection to assure that appropriate
services are provided to a handicapped child.
S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 11–12 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1435–36.
85. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206–07.
86. Id. at 192 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 11 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1435). Also, the Court noted that Congress did not intend to optimize the education of each child
with a disability. Id. at 197 n.21.
87. Id. at 201, 203–04.
88. See id. at 203 (indicating that an appropriate education must “permit the child to benefit
educationally”).
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largely rejected this reading, reasoning that Congress would not have
spent millions of dollars and repeatedly emphasized individualized
instruction unless it intended to confer more than a de minimis
educational benefit; instead, they have held that an appropriate education
is one that is designed to provide a meaningful educational benefit.89
Courts use different formulations to assess the substantive
appropriateness of an IEP, but relevant factors may include the child’s
current abilities,90 the child’s potential,91 whether the educational benefit
is non-trivial,92 and whether significant learning occurred.93
C.

Courts Had Applied the Principle of Least Restriction to Other
Contexts

The history and purposes of the least restrictive alternative movement
lend context to the LRE provisions in the Act and provide a backdrop
against which the placement of preschoolers can be examined. The LRE
requirements had their genesis in the legal principle that the government
cannot impinge on individuals’ rights without justification, a principle
long recognized by American jurisprudence.94 Broadly stated, the least
89. Lower courts have stated this requirement differently. See, e.g., Deal v. Hamilton County Bd.
of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e agree that the IDEA requires an IEP to confer a
‘meaningful educational benefit’ gauged in relation to the potential of the child at issue.”); L.T. v.
Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2004) (“IDEA does not require a public school to
provide what is best for a special needs child, only that it provide an IEP that is ‘reasonably
calculated’ to provide an ‘appropriate’ education.” (quoting Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.,
910 F.2d 983, 992–93 (1st Cir. 1990))); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d
Cir. 1999) (noting that an appropriate education “must be gauged in relation to child’s potential”
and that it requires “significant learning” and “meaningful benefit” (quoting Polk v. Cent.
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182–85 (3d Cir. 1988))); Polk, 853 F.2d at 180
(“[T]he [IDEA] calls for more than a trivial educational benefit.”). But cf. Devine v. Indian River
County Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has
said that a student is only entitled to some educational benefit,” and holding that plaintiff failed to
show that his IEP was “not reasonably calculated to confer the basic floor of educational benefits”).
90. See Deal, 392 F.3d at 864.
91. Id. at 862; T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 578 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 247).
92. Polk, 853 F.2d at 180.
93. Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 247 (citing Polk, 853 F.2d at 182).
94. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230–31 (1821) (promoting “the least
possible power adequate to the end proposed” as the extent to which the government may punish
(emphasis added)). Scholars disagree on the origins of the least restrictive alternative principle. See,
e.g., JAMES W. ELLIS ET AL., THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
65 n.11 (1981) (citing Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), holding that a milk
inspection scheme was overly broad and infringed on interstate commerce interests, as the first
instance of the Supreme Court recognizing the least restrictive alternative principle); Scott A. Fields
& Benjamin M. Ogles, The System of Care for Children and the Least Restrictive Alternative: Legal
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restrictive alternative principle proposes that government actions that
deprive an individual of liberty or property should be narrowly tailored
to achieve state interests or confer benefit to the individual, and that the
least intrusive or stigmatizing means are preferred.95 The least restrictive
alternative principle finds roots in both procedural and substantive due
process doctrines, as well as equal protection principles.96 Courts began
applying the least restrictive alternative principle to mental health
contexts in the 1960s and 1970s by requiring proof that less restrictive
settings were not appropriate before committing a mentally ill individual
to an institutional setting.97
The least restrictive alternative principle spread to the field of special
education as concerns grew that the purported benefits of exclusion did
not outweigh the negative effects resulting from the stigma and lowered
expectations associated with segregated settings.98 These same concerns
spurred Congress to adopt the least restrictive environment requirements
in the 1975 Education for all Handicapped Children Act.99
D.

The LRE Requirement Reflects Congress’s Preference for
Educating Children in Regular Settings

Like all children served by the IDEA, preschool children are entitled
to participate in the least restrictive environment that meets their
needs.100 This Section examines how Congress has used the LRE
principle to express a strong preference for regular settings through
statutory language that prioritizes inclusiveness and endorses a
continuum approach to determining a child’s least restrictive learning

Origins and Current Concerns, 5 CHILD. SERVICES: SOC. POL’Y, RES., & PRAC. 75, 76–77 (2002)
(citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), holding that a law requiring teachers to divulge all
memberships is more intrusive than is needed to meet the state’s legitimate interest in assessing the
competence of its schoolteachers, as the first instance of the Supreme Court recognizing the least
restrictive alternative principle); David Zlotnick, First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative
Analysis and the Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 375, 385 (1981)
(citing Anderson, 19 U.S. at 230–31, as first enunciating the least restrictive alternative principle).
95. See ELLIS, supra note 94, at 17.
96. Id. at 21–25.
97. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095–96 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that
Wisconsin’s commitment procedures violated procedural and substantive due process and reasoning
that the mentally ill cannot be deprived of their liberty without a showing that less drastic
alternatives cannot achieve the same purposes of keeping the individual and society safe).
98. See Note, Enforcing the Right to an “Appropriate” Education: The Education for all
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1119–20 (1978–1979).
99. See id. at 1121.
100. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006).
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environment. Despite Congress’s expressed preference, preschool
children with disabilities are included in regular and inclusive
environments less often than school-age children with disabilities.
1.

The Statutory LRE Requirement Expresses a Strong Preference for
Inclusive Settings

The LRE provisions require a child’s placement to be no more
restrictive than necessary to effect an appropriate education. The
strongly-worded primary LRE provision, which has remained essentially
the same since 1975,101 reveals Congress’s concern for children educated
in segregated environments:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with
disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled,
and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of
children with disabilities from the regular educational
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.102
The statutory language, permitting removal “only when” the child’s
disability prevents the child from being satisfactorily educated in regular
class, is mandatory.103 The IEP team must describe the extent to which a
child will not participate in regular classes, extracurricular offerings, and
nonacademic activities as well as the reasons justifying removal.104
2.

The Department of Education Implementing Regulations Conceive
Restriction as Occurring on a Continuum

The IDEA assumes that a child’s placement will be in the regular
educational environment. But when a child cannot be educated
satisfactorily in that environment, even with supplementary aids and
101. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006), with 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1976) (current
version at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006)). The only change has been that the words “disability” and
“disabled” have been substituted for “handicap” and “handicapped.” The 1975 version reads: “[T]o
the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children . . . are educated with children who are not
handicapped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the handicap is
such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily.”
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
103. See id.
104. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V).
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services, removal is required to the extent necessary to achieve a free
appropriate public education.105 Special classes, special schools, and
institutions are among the special environments available to meet the
child’s needs.106
In recognition that special environments are not equally restrictive, a
regulation titled the “Continuum of alternative placements”
conceptualizes placements as occurring on a continuum of restriction.107
This regulation provides:
(a) Each public agency must ensure that a continuum of
alternative placements is available to meet the needs of children
with disabilities for special education and related services.
(b) The continuum . . . must (1) [i]nclude the alternative
placements listed . . . (instruction in regular classes, special
classes, special schools, home instruction, and instruction in
hospitals and institutions); and (2) [m]ake provision for
supplementary services (such as resource room or itinerant
instruction) to be provided in conjunction with regular class
placement.108
This regulation obligates public agencies to make a continuum of
alternative placements available.109 The continuum, starting with regular
classes and ending with institutions, is usually interpreted as moving
from the least to the most restrictive settings.110 Thus, the level of
restriction increases as the child is removed from the “regular
educational environment” and moved further along the continuum of
restriction.
3.

Preschool Children with Disabilities Participate in Regular
Classrooms Less Often than Their School-Age Counterparts
The LRE provisions apply fully to preschoolers.111 However,

105. See Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, children . . . are educated
with children who are not disabled . . . .” (emphasis added)).
106. 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2008).
107. Id.
108. Id. (formatting modified for brevity).
109. Id. § 300.115(a).
110. See, e.g., D.B. v. Ocean Twp. Bd. of Educ., 985 F. Supp. 457, 490 (D.N.J. 1997) (“Just as
placement in a regular class with supplementary aids and services is at one end of the continuum of
alternate placements required to be made available to special education students under IDEA,
placement at a completely segregated, full time residential facility is at the other end of that
continuum.” (citing Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1400 (D. N.J. 1992), aff’d, 995 F.2d
1204 (3d Cir. 1993))).
111. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116 (2008) (“In determining the educational placement of a child with a
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preschool-age children are not currently included in regular
environments to the same extent as school-age children with
disabilities.112 For example, in its 2005 report to Congress on IDEA
implementation, the Department of Education found that only 34% of
preschoolers were served in settings designed for children without
disabilities, and over one-third were served in classes designed primarily
for children with disabilities.113 In contrast, 60.3% of children in the sixto-eleven age bracket were served primarily in a regular class and only
15% were outside the regular class for more than 60% of the day.114
While some barriers have been identified, the reasons for this
discrepancy between preschoolers and school-age children remain
uncertain. Researchers and scholars have posited that barriers to placing
preschoolers in less restrictive settings include lack of resources at the
district level, stakeholder attitudes, and difficulty coordinating
services.115 In particular, the LRE requirement presents implementation
challenges when preschoolers are involved because there is often no
ready-made, publicly provided environment that clearly fits the bill as
least restrictive. For school-age children, regular public school is the
least restrictive environment possible.116 No obvious analogue exists for
preschoolers for two reasons. First, many school districts do not provide
regular public education for preschool-age children because most states
do not begin compulsory education until age six or older.117 Second, it is
uncertain that formal preschools are necessarily the “regular educational
environment” for all nondisabled preschoolers because many children do
not attend any preschool, while others wait until age four or five.118

disability, including a preschool child with a disability, each public agency must ensure that— (a)
the placement decision . . . [i]s made in conformity with the LRE provisions.” (emphasis added)).
112. TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 24–25.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 45.
115. See Virginia Buysse et al., Implementing Early Childhood Inclusion: Barrier and Support
Factors, 13 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 169 (1998); Eileen M. Borden, Local Variations in Least
Restrictive Environment Placements for Preschool Children with Disabilities: Results of a Pilot
Study, Presented at the 28th Annual Conference of the Northeastern Educational Research Ass’n
(1997) (Ed.D. dissertation, State University of New York), http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/
ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/17/90/ab.pdf.
116. Sch. Comm. v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (“The [IDEA] contemplates that
such education will be provided where possible in regular public schools . . . but the Act also
provides for placement in private schools at public expense where this is not possible.” (citing
statutory authority)).
117. See Education Commission of the States, Compulsory School Age Requirements (2005),
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/50/51/5051.htm (last updated September 2005).
118. In 2005, more than half of three-year-olds and one-third of four-year-olds were not enrolled
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Many of these nondisabled preschool children instead participate in
community settings such as the home or daycare.119
School districts trying to comply with the LRE requirement have
grappled with the unique situation of preschoolers and have arrived at
different solutions. To create access to nondisabled peers, some schools
pay for tuition at private preschools or daycares.120 Others create
“mixed” special education center-based programs that invite
participation from nondisabled children in varying ratios so that children
with IEPs have exposure to nondisabled peers.121 These schools are
operating in the absence of clear guidance from Congress or courts as to
which, if any, of these alternatives is the presumptive least restrictive
environment for their students. This lack of clarity plays out in schools’
differing conclusions. This ambiguity can lead to disagreement between
parents and schools, requiring the courts to review preschool placements
to ensure compliance with the LRE requirement in light of Congress’s
intent.
III. COURTS APPLY THE LRE PROVISIONS INCONSISTENTLY
WHEN PRESCHOOL PLACEMENTS ARE CHALLENGED
Only a handful of federal opinions directly address the LRE
requirement as it applies to preschoolers. The outcomes can be roughly
divided into two categories: those upholding segregated special
education placements as the least restrictive environment, and those
upholding inclusive preschools designed for nondisabled children as the
least restrictive environment. This Part traces representative decisions to
underscore the conflict.

in a preschool education program. See W. Steven Barnett & Donald J. Yarosz, Preschool Policy
Brief: Who Goes to Preschool and Why Does it Matter?, 15 NAT’L INST. OF EARLY EDUC. RES.:
POL’Y BRIEF SERIES 1, 5 (2007), available at http://nieer.org/resources/policybriefs/15.pdf.
119. See id. at 5.
120. See, e.g., Editorial, Improving Preschool Special Education, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1996, at
A16.
121. See, e.g., Samuel L. Odom & Don Bailey, Inclusive Preschool Programs: Classroom
Ecology and Child Outcomes, in EARLY CHILDHOOD INCLUSION: FOCUS ON CHANGE 253, 260–61
(Michael J. Guralnick ed., 2001) (discussing inclusive preschool programs with varying ratios of
children with and without disabilities).
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Courts Upholding Segregated Placements Tend to Discount the
Congressional LRE Mandate While Emphasizing the Burdens
Schools Face in Placing Preschoolers in Regular Programs

One of the first cases in which a segregated special education
preschool classroom was held to constitute the least restrictive
environment was Mark A. v. Grant Wood Area Education Agency.122
Alleah A., a child with cerebral palsy, had been attending Handicare, a
private integrated daycare dedicated to fostering interaction between
children with and without disabilities.123 When Alleah turned three, the
local education agency recommended placement in a special education
preschool program consisting entirely of children with disabilities but
housed in a regular elementary school.124
Alleah’s parents wished her to remain at Handicare and challenged
the proposed placement.125 The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the
segregated placement was appropriate.126 Notably absent from the
opinion is a finding that Alleah’s needs could not be met in the
integrated setting; the court assumed that Alleah could receive
meaningful educational benefit in either the segregated or integrated
setting.127 Reasoning that the public agency only had to provide an
appropriate, rather than best, placement for Alleah, the court held that
the special education preschool was an appropriate placement and that
the LRE requirement did not dictate a contrary result.128
The Mark A. court pointed out that Alleah’s class would be located
within an elementary school that served nondisabled children.129 The
court also noted that Iowa, where Alleah resided, did not have integrated
public preschool programs.130 It concluded, “[w]hile the Act mandates
that handicapped children receive, to the extent possible, an appropriate
public integrated education, it does not compel the state to establish
entire new levels of public education services to satisfy the Act’s

122. 795 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986).
123. Id. at 53.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 54.
127. See id. at 54 (implicitly acknowledging that Alleah’s needs could be better met at Handicare:
“[a]lthough Handicare may indeed offer the best educational opportunities” (emphasis in original)).
128. Id.
129. Id. (“Alleah, at the very least, will be educated in the same school with nonhandicapped
children.”).
130. Id.
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mainstreaming requirements.”131
More than twenty years later, an unpublished decision from the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia adopted similar
reasoning when it failed to acknowledge that regular preschool may be
necessary to meet the LRE requirements for some children. In M.W. v.
Clarke County School District,132 M.W., a three-year-old boy with
autism, was placed in a self-contained autism classroom consisting of at
least three adults working with no more than six children.133 After a few
months, M.W.’s parents became concerned that he was imitating the
idiosyncratic and repetitive behaviors of his classmates.134 They
requested a due process hearing135 and unilaterally removed him from
the autism preschool program after they became convinced that he was
regressing.136 They enrolled him in a private preschool and sought
reimbursement for their expenses on the grounds that M.W. had been
denied an education in the least restrictive environment.137
At the administrative hearing, M.W.’s mother testified that children in
the autism preschool classroom were hitting, kicking, moaning,
screaming, and crying; her testimony was bolstered by audiotapes of the
classroom she had surreptitiously recorded while visiting.138 The
administrative law judge found that the recordings were not necessarily
representative of the school day139 and reasoned that “since the [school
district] does not have its own public school program for non-disabled
three-year-old students, within the continuum of services provided
directly by the [district], M.W. was in the least restrictive
environment.”140
On appeal, the district court reviewed the administrative judge’s
findings and dismissed the complaint.141 The district court, however, did
not directly address the LRE issue—despite testimony that M.W.
flourished in his private preschool among nondisabled children—
because the court found that M.W.’s parents did not meet their burden in
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
No. 3:06-CV-49, 2008 WL 4449591 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2008).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6–7.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6 n.11.
Id. at *9 (citing Final Decision of the ALJ paragraph 92).
Id. at *1–2 (granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint).
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showing that the private preschool was an appropriate placement.142 In a
footnote, the court observed that the IDEA prefers public schools over
private schools and that the district’s autism program was calculated to
provide educational benefits.143 Therefore, the court reasoned, “it is
unclear whether Defendant was required to consider private placement at
all once it determined that its own direct services classroom would
provide M.W. with FAPE.”144 The decision implies that so long as a
child receives an education calculated to confer benefits, the LRE
requirement does not have independent significance, at least at the
preschool level where the only regular programs available may be
private.145
B.

Courts Supporting Regular Preschool Placements Find Congress’s
Mandatory LRE Provisions Controlling, Despite the Difficulties
Posed to Schools

In contrast to the two cases discussed above, the Seventh, Third, and
Tenth Circuits have applied different reasoning to hold that educational
agencies must consider paying for private preschool programs when the
only publicly run preschool programs available are designed for children
with disabilities or academic difficulties.146
In the first of these cases, Board of Education of LaGrange School
District v. Illinois State Board of Education,147 the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals considered the situation of Ryan B., a child with Down
syndrome.148 When Ryan was two, his parents placed him in a private
preschool where he learned alongside nondisabled children.149 After
Ryan’s third birthday, the school district determined he was eligible for
services under the IDEA.150 The district initially recommended placing
Ryan in a program consisting entirely of disabled children but later
offered to consider placing Ryan in a program designed for preschool

142. Id. at *9.
143. Id. at *9 n.16.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004); T.R. ex rel. N.R. v.
Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2000); Bd. of Educ. of LaGrange Sch. Dist. v.
Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 184 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1999).
147. 184 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1999).
148. Id. at 914.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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children at risk of academic failure.151 After observing the “at risk”
classroom, his parents requested a due process hearing, alleging that the
school district did not offer Ryan a program that would provide an
appropriate education in the least restrictive environment.152 The district
court agreed, and on the school district’s appeal the United States
Department of Education filed an amicus brief supporting Ryan’s
position.153
On appeal, the school district argued that the segregated classroom
should be considered Ryan’s least restrictive environment because it was
housed in a regular elementary school.154 The school district stressed that
the regulations suggested placing preschool children in Head Start as a
way to meet the LRE requirement, and argued that the “at risk” program
comported with this suggestion.155
The court of appeals rejected the school district’s arguments and held
that a special class—even if housed in a regular school—was more
restrictive than necessary because Ryan would benefit from a regular
setting.156 Moreover, the court decided that the “at risk” program was not
the least restrictive environment for Ryan.157 Refusing to analogize the
“at risk” preschool to Head Start, the court noted that the children in the

151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 915. In making this argument, the school district relied on implementing regulation
commentary dealing with the least restrictive environment, providing:
Public agencies that do not operate programs for nondisabled children are not required to
initiate such programs to satisfy the requirements regarding placement in the LRE . . . . For
these public agencies, some alternative methods for meeting the requirements include (1)
Providing opportunities for participation (even part time) of preschool children with disabilities
in other preschool programs operated by public agencies (such as Head Start); (2) Placing
children with disabilities in private school programs for nondisabled preschool children or
private preschool programs that integrate children with disabilities and nondisabled children;
and (3) Locating classes for preschool children with disabilities in regular elementary schools.
In each case the public agency must ensure that each child’s placement is in the LRE in which
the unique needs of that child can be met, based on the child’s IEP, and meets all of the other
requirements of [relevant regulations].
Id. at 915–16 (citing commentary to 34 C.F.R. § 300.552). The school district contended that since
it complied with this alternative, it was relieved of any further obligation under the LRE provision.
Id. This commentary has since been removed from the regulations.
155. Id. (noting that “[t]he School District argues that the Project IDEAL/At-Risk program is a
FAPE because it is similar to Head Start, and thus meets the first alternative provided in the
commentary to 34 C.F.R. § 300.552”).
156. See id. at 917 (“[W]e agree that the Brook Park placement is not a FAPE for Ryan within the
meaning of the IDEA because it does not provide the least restrictive environment in which his
individual needs can be met.”).
157. Id. (“[T]he At-Risk program offered by the School District was not sufficient to provide the
least restrictive environment for Ryan, based on his unique needs.”).
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“at risk” program were selected because they were all at risk of
academic failure, while Head Start selected children based exclusively
on income.158 Because the “at risk” program—unlike Head Start—
excluded all children expected to perform typically, it could not be a
“regular” classroom.159 The school district was required to pay for
Ryan’s private preschool tuition because none of the school district’s
proposed placements met the LRE requirement.160
On the heels of LaGrange School District, a Third Circuit decision
applied similar reasoning to different facts and held that a mixed class
including nondisabled children was not a “regular” class and therefore
not the least restrictive environment. In T.R. ex rel. N.R. v. Kingwood
Township Board of Education,161 the board offered five-year-old N.R. a
placement in a regular kindergarten, but N.R.’s parents wanted him to
remain in preschool because state law did not require enrollment in
kindergarten until age six.162 The board did not provide any regular
preschool programs, but did have a mixed special education preschool
classroom in which half the children were nondisabled.163 It was
proposed that N.R. attend this classroom in the mornings and spend his
afternoons in a resource room.164 N.R.’s parents rejected this proposed
placement and asked for tuition and supplemental services at N.R.’s
private daycare center.165
The board requested a due process hearing to determine the validity
of the proposed placement.166 The hearing officer sided with the board;
N.R.’s parents appealed to the district court, lost there, and appealed
again.167

158. Id. at 917 n.2. “Head Start is a national program that promotes school readiness by
enhancing the social and cognitive development of children through the provision of educational,
health, nutritional, social and other services to enrolled children and families.” About the Office of
Head Start, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ohs/about/index.html#factsheet (last visited Dec. 18,
2009).
159. LaGrange Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d at 917 n.2.
160. Id. The court concluded by noting that the tuition of seventy-five dollars per month was less
than the amount the district had planned to expend in bussing Ryan to the segregated class, and
“certainly less than the attorneys’ fees [the school district] presumably incurred prosecuting the
appeal.” Id. at 918 (quoting the district court).
161. 205 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2000).
162. Id. at 576 & n.1.
163. Id. at 576.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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The court of appeals vindicated the parents’ position, holding that the
mixed classroom did not constitute the least restrictive environment.168
The mixed class was designed to support children with disabilities, who
constituted half the class; therefore the court found that it was more
restrictive than a regular preschool class.169 Because the record
contained no evidence that N.R.’s IEP could not be successfully
implemented in a regular class, the board had to consider that option.170
A few years later, the Tenth Circuit examined facts similar to those
encountered in Kingwood Township in L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo School
District.171 K.B. was a preschool child with an autism spectrum disorder
and, like N.R., was offered a placement in a mixed special education
preschool which included between thirty and fifty percent nondisabled
children who served as models to the children with disabilities.172 K.B.’s
parents rejected the proposed placement and instead enrolled her in a
regular preschool with an aide and augmented her classroom experience
with between twenty-five and thirty hours per week of additional
therapy.173 Seeking reimbursement, K.B.’s parents requested a due
process hearing.174 The hearing officer decided in favor of the school
district and the district court affirmed.175
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the school district’s contention
that K.B.’s reliance on her aide made the regular preschool more
restrictive than the mixed class,176 finding this argument belied by
evidence that K.B.’s dependence had decreased and she was behaving
appropriately at school with minimal prompts from her aide.177 Because
K.B. was the most academically advanced child at her regular preschool,
the court viewed that setting as more likely to provide academic benefits
to her than the mixed classroom, where the average student functioned at
a lower level.178 Therefore, the mixed classroom was not K.B.’s least
168. Id. at 582.
169. See id. at 579.
170. Id. at 579–80.
171. 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004).
172. See id. at 968.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 969.
175. Id. at 969–70.
176. Id. at 977.
177. See id. at 972. Other factors that persuaded the court that the mixed preschool was not the
least restrictive environment for K.B. included the fact that the private preschool had a more
balanced gender ratio and a group of peers better suited to model appropriate social skills. Id. at
978.
178. Id. at 978.
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restrictive environment, and the court further held that her parents were
entitled to reimbursement for the costs of K.B.’s regular preschool.179
IV. WHEN DECIDING LRE CASES, COURTS SHOULD FIRST
LOOK TO THE CHILD’S PRESUMPTIVE LEAST
RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT
A uniform approach to deciding preschool least restrictive
environment cases is needed. To effectuate the LRE requirement, courts
should identify the settings where a preschool child’s peers are educated
as that child’s presumptive least restrictive environment. The child
should be placed in his or her presumptive least restrictive environment
unless that placement would be inconsistent with the child’s right to an
appropriate education.
A.

The Split Between Courts Considering the LRE Requirements for
Preschoolers Suggests the Need for a Uniform Test

The five cases discussed above represent two different approaches
that are not reconcilable. The courts that found no obligation to provide
services in more normalized settings engaged in fundamentally different
inquiries than the courts that found otherwise. The Mark A. and M.W.
courts—which upheld segregated placements—did so despite evidence
that the child could succeed in an integrated setting.180 These courts
accepted a showing that segregated settings conferred some educational
benefits as sufficient to fulfill the LRE requirement—a requirement they
seemed to view as having no independent significance once the
threshold of a substantively appropriate education was met. For
example, once the court in M.W. determined that M.W. could receive an
adequate education in the autism preschool program, the court was
“unclear” whether the less restrictive preschool needed consideration.181
Similarly, while the Mark A. court acknowledged that Alleah could
receive an appropriate education in her daycare setting, it refused to
require the state to provide that setting because it was not a publicly run
program and her education in the segregated setting was adequate.182
In contrast, L.B., Kingwood Township, and LaGrange School District

179. Id.
180. See supra notes 127–128, 142, and accompanying text.
181. M.W. v. Clarke County Sch. Dist., No. 3:06-CV-49, 2008 WL 4449591, at *9 n.16 (M.D.
Ga. Sept. 29, 2008).
182. Mark A. v. Grant Wood Area Educ. Agency, 795 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986).
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stand for the proposition that a school must justify placing a preschool
child in a more restrictive classroom based on the child’s needs. Courts
following these decisions are likely to find that preschool programs
composed of high numbers of children with disabilities, or children at
risk of social or academic problems, are more restrictive than programs
designed for and attended by nondisabled children who are developing
normally.183
The latter cases represent a more correct analysis of the LRE
provisions for two reasons. First, these cases are aligned with Congress’s
intent because they acknowledge that placing a child in a classroom
designed for children with disabilities constitutes the “removal . . . from
the regular educational environment” that demands justification based
on the child’s needs.184 School districts should not remove disabled
preschoolers from regular educational environments just because they
decline to educate nondisabled preschoolers—administrative and
logistical challenges are not sufficient justifications for segregation.
Second, these cases implicitly recognize that the LRE requirement is
analytically separate from the free appropriate public education
requirement, and the IDEA mandates that states meet both
requirements.185
Although these courts recognized that regular preschools are less
restrictive than special preschools, their analysis was incomplete because
they did not ask or answer the question of whether the regular preschools
were in fact the presumptive least restrictive environment. Instead, they
looked at the possibilities before them—regular and special
preschools—and deemed the least restrictive option the more appropriate
placement.186 However, in determining the least restrictive environment
183. But see A.U. ex rel. N.U. v. Roane County Bd. of Educ., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Tenn.
2007) (holding that placement in a “collaborative” Head Start/special education classroom with fifty
percent typically developing children would provide a free appropriate public education in the least
restrictive environment, even though the child’s needs could have been met in a classroom
consisting of nondisabled children).
184. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006) (“[R]emoval . . . occurs only when the nature or severity
of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes . . . cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.” (emphasis added)).
185. Although the statutory language suggests that placement in the least restrictive environment
is a component of determining whether a child has received a free appropriate public education, see
id. §§ 1401(9), 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V), the Rowley substantive standard for “appropriate” education is
distinct from whether or not that education also occurs in the least restrictive environment. See Bd.
of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201, 206–07 (1982). It is possible for a child to have an
education that meets Rowley’s substantive requirements of appropriateness in a variety of
environments, but the IDEA additionally requires that the child be placed in the least restrictive
option where he or she can receive this appropriate education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
186. See supra part III.B.
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for a child, courts should instead first determine what the presumptive
least restrictive environment is—what the IDEA refers to as the “regular
educational environment”—for similarly aged nondisabled preschool
children in the community, before determining whether placement in
that environment would be appropriate for an individual child.
The grounding historical principle of LRE analysis—normal
environments whenever possible—suggests that children with
disabilities should participate in the same environments they would if
they were nondisabled, so long as their educational needs can be met.187
To effectuate this principle, courts should use a two-step process to
identify the presumptive least restrictive environment for a preschool
child. First, courts should consider the appropriate activities in which the
child’s same-aged nondisabled peers in the community engage. These
activities must be identified before placement can be addressed because
the IDEA requires that, when appropriate, a preschool child’s IEP
address the ways the disability affects participation in appropriate
activities.188 Second, courts should consider the settings in which these
activities occur, because these settings will constitute the child’s
presumptive least restrictive environment.
This process mirrors the reasoning implicit in Congress’s position that
the regular class constitutes the presumptive least restrictive
environment for school-age children,189 for whom school-based
education is not only universally available, but also compulsory, in all
fifty states.190 By contrast, there is no nationwide, standard educational
environment for nondisabled three- to five-year-old children. Because
the presumptive least restrictive environment for preschoolers is both
age- and community-specific, no single option will be the presumptive
least restrictive environment for all preschool children. Once the
presumptive least restrictive environment is identified for a child, the
court must determine if it is the child’s least restrictive environment
appropriate to his or her needs—a determination that requires
considering whether the child’s needs can be met in that environment
187. See supra part II.C.
188. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(bb).
189. See id. § 1412(a)(5); see also supra Part II.D.3.
190. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Compulsory Education, http://ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid=12943 (last visited Dec. 21, 2009) (“Today, every state and territory requires
children to enroll in public or private education or to be home-schooled. More than half—32
states—require students to begin their education by age 6. Some states’ [sic] set their age
requirements as low as age 5 and as high as age 8. All children are required to continue their
education into their high school years, with 26 states setting the cutoff age at 16. The remaining
states require students to stay in school through age 17 or 18.”).
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with supplementary aids and services.
B.

Preschool Children Engage in Appropriate Activities in a Number
of Environments, Including Preschool Classes, the Community,
and the Home

As set forth in the Section above, the first step in identifying the
presumptive least restrictive environment for a preschool child is to
identify the appropriate activities191 that same-aged preschool children in
the child’s community engage in. Although the IDEA does not define
the meaning of appropriate activities, the statute’s strong emphasis on
participation in the general education curriculum, starting in
kindergarten, anticipates that preschool education will focus on
preparing children to participate in the general curriculum upon
kindergarten entry.192 Because of this focus, the IDEA’s requirement that
IEP teams consider how the disability impacts the child’s participation in
appropriate activities—before crafting goals addressing the child’s
educational needs resulting from the disability193—should be understood
as a requirement to consider those abilities and activities that enable
preschool children to enter kindergarten and progress in the general
curriculum.
Nondisabled children who are kindergarten-ready have social,
cognitive, and language foundations that they leverage for rapid
learning. Generally, these children enter kindergarten largely fluent in
their native language,194 socially aware and able to learn in a group
setting,195 and competent in basic self-help and motor skills.196 These are

191. The IDEA refers to preschool children participating in “appropriate activities.” See 20
U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
192. Congressional findings note that the education of children with disabilities can be made
more effective by “having high expectations for such children and ensuring their access to the
general education curriculum in the regular classroom, to the maximum extent possible, in order
to . . . be prepared to lead productive and independent adult lives, to the maximum extent possible.”
Id. § 1400(c)(5).
193. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A).
194. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Powell, Speech and Language: Causes, Milestones and Suggestions
(2000), http://www.childrensdisabilities.info/speech/guidelines.html (“A five-year-old typically
understands 2500–2800 words, speaks in 5–8 word sentences, uses 1500–2000 words and tells long
stories accurately.”).
195. See Pamela C. High, School Readiness, 121 PEDIATRICS 1008, 1010 (2008) (noting that 77%
of first-time kindergarteners “often” form friendships).
196. See, e.g., Ellen H. Parlapiano, Ready for Kindergarten? Five Teachers Tell You What
Preschoolers Really Need for Next Year, http://www2.scholastic.com/browse/article.jsp?id=701
(last visited Dec. 21, 2009).
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some of the appropriate activities that enable nondisabled children to
begin kindergarten prepared to participate in the general curriculum and
benefit from regular education.
Significantly, nondisabled children can acquire most kindergartenreadiness skills without formal instruction of any kind.197 Before age
five, these children meet their developmental milestones and engage in
activities that prepare them for kindergarten in a variety of
environments, including home, daycare, and other community
settings.198 These settings, therefore, can all constitute the presumptive
least restrictive environment for preschoolers with disabilities learning to
engage in appropriate activities. Unlike the general curriculum delivered
to school-age children, where instruction takes place almost entirely
within the schoolhouse, preschoolers engage in appropriate activities
throughout most of their waking hours. Although instruction in preacademic skills may be a focus of preschool classrooms, pre-academic
skills are a small and relatively unimportant slice of the myriad abilities
preschool children must develop to begin a general curriculum by
kindergarten—abilities that are largely acquired outside a formal
preschool setting.199
In communities where a preschooler’s nondisabled peers do not
participate in a structured preschool program, educators should regard
community settings where nondisabled children engage in appropriate
activities, such as home and daycare, as constituting the presumptive
least restrictive environment. Although the continuum regulation
suggests that home is a fairly restrictive placement,200 this suggestion
197. NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE EDUC. OF YOUNG CHILDREN, SCHOOL READINESS: A POSITION
STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE EDUCATION OF YOUNG CHILDREN, at 1
(1995), http://www.naeyc.org/files/naeyc/file/positions/PSREADY98.PDF (“Every child, except in
the most severe instances of abuse, neglect, or disability, enters school ready to learn school
content.”).
198. See Alison Gopnik, Op-Ed., Your Baby is Smarter than You Think, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
2009, at WK10. The author notes:
Schoolwork revolves around focus and planning. We set objectives and goals for children, with
an emphasis on skills they should acquire or information they should know. Children take tests
to prove that they have absorbed a specific set of skills and facts and have not been distracted
by other possibilities. This approach may work for children over the age of 5 or so. But babies
and very young children . . . . aren’t trying to learn one particular skill or set of facts; instead,
they are drawn to anything new, unexpected or informative.
Id.
199. See High, supra note 195, at 1013 (“Three qualities that are necessary for children to be
ready for school are intellectual skills, motivation to learn, and strong social-emotional capacity and
support. These qualities are influenced by the health and well-being of the families and
neighborhoods in which children are raised.”).
200. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2009). The continuum regulation states that the continuum of
alternative placements must include “instruction in regular classes, special classes, special schools,
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should be considered inapplicable to preschoolers for two reasons. First,
this regulation applies to children ages three through twenty-one; the
majority of this population is school-age. Bolstering the notion that the
regulation does not apply to preschoolers is the suggestion that the
regular class is the normal environment for nondisabled children.201 This
presumption cannot extend to preschoolers for whom no standard
“regular class” exists.
The full context of the IDEA suggests that this regulation should not
be applied to preschoolers. The Act implies that preschoolers may have a
different presumptive least restrictive environment than school-age
children. For example, the statutory language providing that home and
community settings are least restrictive environments for infants and
toddlers,202 and allowing a toddler’s service plan to remain in effect until
age five,203 strongly suggests that community settings, including the
home, may be a child’s least restrictive environment from birth through

home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions.” Id. The continuum listed is generally
considered to move from a least restrictive to most restrictive settings, suggesting that home is
among the more restrictive. See, e.g., D.B. v. Ocean Twp. Bd. of Educ., 985 F. Supp. 457, 490
(D.N.J. 1997) (“Just as placement in a regular class with supplementary aids and services is at one
end of the continuum of alternate placements required to be made available to special education
students under IDEA, placement at a completely segregated, full time residential facility is at the
other end of that continuum.” (citing Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1400 (D.N.J.
1992)).
201. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2009). This presumption of the home as a highly restrictive
environment makes sense with respect to school-aged children, because the normal environment for
these children to learn the general curriculum is the regular class. The continuum becomes more
restrictive as the setting becomes less and less like a regular class. For example, the next step on the
continuum is a special class in a regular school, which although more restrictive than a regular class,
at least has many of the same features that make the regular class the “normal” environment of
instruction—a community of children, teachers, and a building dedicated to learning. Proceeding
along the continuum, a special school also has many of the features of a regular class in a regular
school, and is considerably less restrictive than home. By contrast, homebound instruction is an
aberrant instructional environment for a school-age child because there is no participation in a
“class” of any sort, which is the hallmark of formal schooling and delivery of the general
curriculum. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the Early
Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,405, 12,638
(Dep’t of Educ. Mar. 12, 1999) (“Home instruction is, for school-aged children, the most restrictive
type of placement because it does not permit education to take place with other children. For that
reason, home instruction should be relied on as the means of providing FAPE to a school-aged child
with a disability only in those limited circumstances when they cannot be educated with other
children even with the use of appropriate related services and supplementary aids and services, such
as when a child is recovering from surgery.”).
202. See 20 U.S.C. § 1432(4)(G) (2006) (noting that, to the maximum extent appropriate, early
intervention services are “provided in natural environments, including the home, and community
settings in which children without disabilities participate”).
203. See id. § 1414(d)(2)(B).
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age five.204 For preschoolers, learning at home may be normalizing
instead of stigmatizing, and services should be more freely offered in
this setting when appropriate and in line with the environments in which
the child’s nondisabled same-age peers participate.205
Where preschool is a community norm, there may be two concurrent
least restrictive environments: a regular preschool will constitute the
presumptive least restrictive environment for delivery of what might be
called a “quasi-general curriculum,” while community settings will
likely be the presumptive least restrictive environment for engaging in
some “appropriate activities.”

204. In 1997, the Department of Education issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in which it
proposed a “continuum of alternative placements” regulation, identical to the one currently in effect
with the exception of an explanatory note intended to follow the regulation. Assistance to States for
the Education of Children with Disabilities, Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, and
Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,026, 55,107
(proposed Oct. 22, 1997). The note stated that “[h]ome instruction is usually appropriate for only a
limited number of children, such as children who are medically fragile and are not able to
participate in a school setting with other children.” Id. In response, some commentators requested
that the note be modified to state that home instruction services may be appropriate for young
children. Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the Early
Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg.12,405, 12,638 (Mar.
12, 1999). The agency ultimately decided to omit the note, and included in its explanation of the
deletion that “[i]nstruction at home may be the most natural environment for a young child with a
disability.” Id. To the extent that the proposed note gave the erroneous impression that home was
not an appropriate placement for most preschoolers, it was corrected only partly by eliminating it.
The Department should have gone farther and added a comment to the regulation, explicitly stating
that the home may very well be the most natural environment for many preschoolers. By leaving
this acknowledgement buried in a several-hundred page statement of basis and purpose in the
Federal Register, the Department lost an opportunity to clarify the continuum of alternative
placements so that it might be more apt for preschoolers.
205. Additionally, in responding to commentators’ suggestions to the IDEA’s regulations issued
in 2006, the Department of Education noted that:
The LRE requirements in §§ 300.114 through 300.118 apply to all children with disabilities,
including preschool children who are entitled to FAPE. Public agencies that do not operate
programs for preschool children without disabilities are not required to initiate those programs
solely to satisfy the LRE requirements of the Act. Public agencies that do not have an inclusive
public preschool that can provide all the appropriate services and supports must explore
alternative methods to ensure that the LRE requirements are met. Examples of such alternative
methods might include placement options in private preschool programs or other communitybased settings. Paying for the placement of qualified preschool children with disabilities in a
private preschool with children without disabilities is one, but not the only, option available to
public agencies to meet the LRE requirements. We believe the regulations should allow public
agencies to choose an appropriate option to meet the LRE requirements. However, if a public
agency determines that placement in a private preschool program is necessary as a means of
providing special education and related services to a child with a disability, the program must
be at no cost to the parent of the child.
Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for
Children With Disabilities; Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,589 (Aug. 14, 2006).
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When a Preschool Classroom Is the Least Restrictive Environment
for a Child, the Classroom Should Be No More Restrictive than
Necessary

Home and other community settings are not necessarily the
presumptive least restrictive environment possible for all preschoolers.
As the Ryan B. court suggested, the IDEA’s regulations anticipate that
regular preschool can be the presumptive least restrictive
environment.206 Whether regular preschool is a sufficiently normal
environment such that it constitutes the least restrictive environment
must be determined by looking to community norms for nondisabled
children. In a community where the majority of children participate in
formal preschool before kindergarten, the community has what might be
described as a “quasi-general curriculum” for preschool-age children. In
such a community, preschool attendance is likely to be viewed as an
expected precursor to kindergarten. Furthermore, the absence of a
preschool experience is likely to be perceived as a significant
disadvantage because local schools count on incoming kindergarteners
having more extensive pre-academic skills and exposure to formal
preschool activities than might be expected in other communities where
preschool is less common.
Because the LRE requirement looks first to what is normal for the
general population, age is also a relevant factor when determining the
least restrictive environment for a particular child. In a community
where preschool attendance is expected, regular preschools are likely to
constitute the least restrictive environment possible for children with
disabilities of the same age as nondisabled attendees. Thus, if regular
preschool is available to nondisabled children only when they turn three
by the start of the school year, a disabled child whose third birthday is in
December may not have a regular preschool become his presumptive
least restrictive environment until the following fall. Likewise, if
nondisabled children do not participate in preschool until their prekindergarten year, preschool may not be the presumptive least restrictive
environment for a disabled child until age four in that community.
When preschool is the presumptive least restrictive environment, the
preschool should be, to the maximum extent appropriate, one that is
designed for nondisabled children.207 If preschool possibilities were to
be placed on a continuum from least to most restrictive, regular

206. See supra notes 147–160 and accompanying text.
207. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
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preschools designed for nondisabled children should be the presumptive
least restrictive environment, while special preschools designed for and
attended exclusively by disabled children should be considered highly
restrictive. Mixed and at-risk programs would fall somewhere in
between regular and special preschools.
In communities where the local school district or other educational
agency does not provide regular preschool to nondisabled children, it is
likely that the least restrictive preschool option will be private. This may
mean that the school district or other educational agency must pay
private tuition for those students who can receive a free appropriate
public education in a regular preschool. The IDEA does not exempt
educational agencies from the obligation to provide a free appropriate
public education in the least restrictive environment on the grounds that
the school district does not provide regular preschools.208 In fact, the
IDEA provisions anticipate that agencies will contract with private
schools when necessary to achieve an appropriate education.209 Agencies
also have the option of creating public preschools, which could be
financed at least in part by charging tuition to nondisabled children.
D.

The Proposed Framework First Identifies the Presumptive Least
Restrictive Environment, then Asks Whether the Child Can Be
Educated in This Environment

Assuming that the IEP has substantively valid goals that are
reasonably calculated to confer an appropriate education, courts
reviewing preschool placement should ask three questions when trying
to determine a preschool child’s least restrictive environment.
First, is the presumptive least restrictive environment the home and
community, or is it a preschool setting? The answer to this inquiry will
depend on whether same-aged nondisabled children generally participate
in a quasi-general curriculum in a structured preschool setting. If they
do, then a preschool is the presumptive least restrictive environment. If
the community does not have a quasi-general curriculum, then the
presumptive least restrictive environment is the home and community—
the same settings in which nondisabled preschoolers engage in
appropriate activities.
After the presumptive least restrictive environment is determined, the
second question should be: does the nature or severity of the child’s
disability prevent the child from being satisfactorily educated in this
208. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
209. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29).
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environment, assuming the use of supplementary aids and services?210 If
the answer is no, then the presumptive least restrictive environment is
the child’s least restrictive environment and is the appropriate
placement.
The final question should be: is the child included in the regular
educational environment to the maximum extent appropriate?211 For
example, if a child requires a special preschool classroom, but could eat
snack or play on the playground with the regular preschool class, then
that child should be included in the regular preschool activities to the
maximum extent appropriate to her needs, instead of remaining in a
segregated setting.
By determining the presumptive least restrictive environment for a
preschool child first, courts will ensure that preschool children with
disabilities are being educated, insofar as appropriate, in the same
environments that are normal for their nondisabled peers—which was
Congress’s primary aim when it enacted the LRE requirements.212
CONCLUSION
Courts should reject the approach of the Mark A. and M.W. courts
when assessing the least restrictive environment for preschoolers.
However, they must dig deeper than the LaGrange School District,
Kingwood Township, and Nebo School District courts, which did not
require a showing that the child participated in the presumptive least
restrictive environment to the maximum extent appropriate. Instead,
courts should embrace a community-specific standard where the
presumptive least restrictive environment is the setting in which a
preschool child’s same-aged nondisabled peers are being educated.
When a child can be successfully educated in this setting with the
provision of supplementary aids and services, the presumptive least
restrictive environment will determine the child’s placement.
By using the learning environments of same-aged preschoolers in the
community as the norm by which the least restrictive environment is
determined for a preschool child, courts can advance the congressional
purposes of reducing segregation while remaining true to the child’s
educational needs.

210. See id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
211. See id.
212. See supra Part II.D.

